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Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP90-00509R000100030030-1

DCI-IC 78-2814

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

FROM:

[redacted]
Chief, Human Resources Division

SUBJECT: Comments on "LITINT" Survey

REFERENCE: A Survey of Literature Intelligence Resources
and Operations, by [redacted]

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1. (S) [redacted] findings as to the strengths and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community's present arrangements for collecting open source intelligence, which he calls "LITINT", are not markedly different from our own understanding of that situation, and he appears to have identified the principal areas where improvements could be made. We do not endorse his recommendation, however, that the Intelligence Community seek to remedy the many problems in this area by going directly to central coordination (read management) of LITINT activities, modeled to some extent after the Soviet Union approach to this field of activity. What works for them is not necessarily best for us.

2. (S) The functional weaknesses identified by [redacted] are less collection problems, or guidance problems, than system problems, and they may lend themselves to system design solutions short of resorting to "centralized coordination of LITINT activities within a single resource management organization" as recommended in the paper. As we see it, the initial step should be to build on the acknowledged strengths of the existing interdepartmental arrangements, and redesign or systematize the present combination of formal, informal and otherwise ad hoc arrangements to achieve effectiveness with existing resources, if that is feasible.

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3. (S) There may be some long term gains to be realized by bringing the translation, data reduction, literature search, and analysis/production "LITINT" tasks "inside" instead of contracting for them as is the case today in many instances, but we would want to see that argumentation developed fully on the basis of expected increases in effectiveness and efficiency, apart from the issue of centralization versus departmental mutual assistance as a management choice.

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4. (S) It should also be mentioned here that the "LITINT" activity addressed in the survey is limited to Intelligence Community sponsored open source collection (OSCOL) activity (CIA, DIA, NSA, Army Navy, Air Force) and does not address the potential of open-source foreign information holdings of non-intelligence departments and agencies such as Commerce, Labor, Transportation, Energy, AID, Agriculture, etc. The activities of the State Department directed Interagency Map and Publication Procurement Committee (IMPAC) are referred to only in passing in this survey. We believe these inter-related opportunities for improvement in open source collection might best be addressed together.

5. (C) In summary, while we have reservations concerning some of the survey's conclusions and recommendations, we believe the survey will be a very useful tool for our own efforts in the OSCOL field.



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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 17 February 1978	
TO: D/DCI/CT			
ROOM NO. 6N01		BUILDING CHB	
REMARKS: The attached memo contains my informal comments to the Information Handling Division on the [REDACTED] LITINT paper. As I noted, I haven't seen the part of the report which contains the evidence and analysis, so my comments might not be fair or relevant. Nonetheless, I am sending it to you on the chance that it might be of some use.			
FROM: [REDACTED]		OPEI/PAID	
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13 FEB 1978

25X1A MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Information Handling Division

25X1A FROM:

[REDACTED]
OPEI/PAID

25X1A SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] Survey of Literature Intelligence
(LITINT) Resources and Operations (U)

1. (U) As you requested, I have reviewed the subject report and am forwarding my comments.
2. (U) First, it is unfair to comment on a study for which only the summaries and conclusions are completed. Without access to the main body of the report, my comments might be unjustified and irrelevant.
3. (U) As the report now stands, however, I have some misgivings:
 - The report does not provide, except for Table 1-1, a survey of LITINT resources and operations. It would be useful and expected for the study to include a detailed inventory of the manpower and functions now and in the past by the various intelligence agencies.
 - The report should focus on intelligence activities. If other activities are surveyed (e.g., Commerce, Patent Office, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, National Academy of Sciences, etc.), the extent to which they complement intelligence activities (and how) should be made clear. Work that they do that is available to the Community places a bound on what the Community can be expected to do for itself.
 - The report gives the impression of having defined LITINT in a very general (and vague) way. It includes acquisition of foreign publications, libraries and their holdings, translation activities, (human and machine) and computer data bases. The inclusion of data bases probably diffuses the effort and leads the author into very specialized problems. Moreover, if the author is to examine FTD's CIRC, he should also include CIA's AEGIS, which has been omitted. This type of omission raises questions about the completeness of the survey.
 - The report's analysis proceeds from the author's unsubstantiated assertion that LITINT is under exploited by the Community due, among other things, to a general unawareness of LITINT's utility and potential contribution to the improvement of the national intelligence product. The scope and variety of activities

in Table 1-1 belies this assertion. Furthermore, LITINT does not support all types of intelligence (e.g., it is of little value to analysis of P and C of ballistic missiles), but many analysts are almost totally reliant upon foreign open literature (e.g., political and economic analysts and S&T analysts) and are fully aware of their dependence.


--The report does not attempt to survey and analyze what is being done in various foreign language areas. What is the distribution of effort among the literatures of USSR, PRC, Bloc, and the rest of the world? Are there imbalances? Should more effort go into friendly and third-world literatures? How much, and at what cost? What is the estimated volume of literature of even the USSR (and Pact) and PRC? What measures does the author use for the alleged underexploitation of LITINT?

--The author asserts that improved use of LITINT would make it possible to sanitize and publish unclassified intelligence reports and to establish a bridge to academia and the American people. Although many of our products are, indeed, overclassified, considerable efforts are already made to sanitize and downgrade many of our products. Since the academic community, using many of the same LITINT resources as the Intelligence Community, is familiar with what is being said in foreign presses, there is a risk of being found short in a conclusion that is not supported by LITINT. Moreover, analysis based on a single source, be it LITINT or SIGINT, is incomplete and runs the risk of lacking full perspective.

--The report asserts that "LITINT activities...are the least coordinated functional support system..." No comparative evidence for this assertion is provided.

--An unofficial community-wide functional LITINT system is said to exist (never described), which is said to be capable of greater efficiency. Most systems (including automobile engines) are capable of greater efficiency, so this is a safe and probably valid assertion. However, the summaries provide no indication of the efficiency measures used. Later, the report finds that most LITINT organizations are well-managed, productive, and (in terms of volume) cost effective.

4. (U) All of the above notwithstanding, the need to have better coordination, division of labor, leadership, etc., is clear.



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ATTACHED ARE THE
COMMENTS YOU REQUESTED
ON KITINT FROM HILL.
I'VE ALSO ATTACHED A COPY
OF COMMENTS I OBTAINED
FROM DPES.

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
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NOTE FOR:

Attached are the comments you requested on the LITINT survey.

We understand OPEI also is preparing comments based on the Executive Summary of the survey.

AC/HRD

Attachments:
LITINT Survey
Comments on Survey

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

AC/HRD

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

17 February 1978 25X1A

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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D/DCI/CT

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